Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
Paper Series
心
1999

Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial
intermediation
Edward J. GREEN

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Green, E. J. (1999). Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation (CPPS
Working Paper Series No.92). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/
cppswp/46/

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究
中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy
Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Working Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies

5
No. 92 (4/99)
CPPS
7

Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial
Intermediation
by
Professor Edward J. Green and
Dr. Ping Lin

Lingnan University
Hong Kong

Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial
Intermediation

Edward J. Green and
Ping Lin

June 1999

 Edward J. Green and Ping Lin
Professor Edward J. Green is Senior Research Officer of Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, USA
Dr. Ping Lin is Assistant Professor of Department of Economics,
Lingnan College, Hong Kong.

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
Tuen Mun
Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2616 7432
Fax: (852) 2591 0690

CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and
critical comment. Opinions expressed in them are the author’s and
should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres or
Lingnan University. These papers may be freely circulated but they are
not to be quoted without the written permission of the author. Please
address comments and suggestions to the author.

Implementing E¢cient Allocations in a
Model of Financial Intermediation
Edward J. Green and Ping Lin¤

Abstract
In a …nite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, the
ex-ante e¢cient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e.,
each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which
truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When
the model is modi…ed by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf.
Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric,
ex-ante e¢cient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies.
Keywords: Financial intermediation, bank run, implementation.
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Introduction

This paper concerns the implementation of e¢cient allocations in a model of
maturity transformation in …nancial structure. Maturity transformation is the
…nancing of an intermediary’s assets by liabilities (demand deposits at a bank, in
particular) that are callable before the assets themselves mature. Bryant (1980)
shows that such a portfolio structure is a means of insuring the depositors against
unobservable risks. He implicitly represents a bank as a rule or “allocation mechanism” that speci…es the outcome, in each state of nature, of each possible pro…le
of traders’ decisions regarding whether or not to exercise the call options on their
¤
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deposits. Bryant observes that maturity transformation is necessary in order to
implement the symmetric, ex-ante e¢cient allocation as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. He also shows also that some mechanisms that do implement that e¢cient
allocation—notably the mechanism that most faithfully re‡ects the features of
a bank-deposit contract in the context of his model—also can possess bank-run
equilibria.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) address a set of issues related to Bryant. They
study a model that brings the role of aggregate risk into sharp focus. They prove
the following main results.
1. Demand deposit contracts can provide e¢cient risk-sharing. However,
they can also produce bank runs even in an environment where there
is no aggregate risk.
2. There is an allocation mechanism, suggested by historical banking
regimes that have permitted suspension of convertability of deposits
when a “run” occurs, that implements the symmetric, ex-ante optimal
allocation in strictly dominant strategies. This is intuitively a particularly compelling notion of implementation that implies, among other
things, that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique. Obviously, then,
there cannot be multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria.
3. In some environments with aggregate risk, a deposit scheme with suspension of payments cannot implement the ex-ante e¢cient allocation.
However, it is possible to implement the e¢cient allocation in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium by establishing a deposit insurance scheme.
Regarding the last result, Diamond and Dybvig’s analysis does not establish
whether or not there is any allocation mechanism that implements the e¢cient
allocation as a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Wallace (1988) provides a
formalization of the sequential-service constraint to which previous researchers
had appealed informally. He proves the following result. If the provision of deposit
insurance is genuinely regarded as a feature of the overall allocation mechanism,
and if it is this overall mechanism to which the sequential-service constraint
applies, then deposit insurance is not feasible to provide. Taken together, these
results raise the possibility that existence of a “bank-run” equilibrium might be an
2

unavoidable problem for any mechanism that implements the e¢cient allocation
as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an environment with aggregate risk.
In this paper, we reconsider the implementation problem in the Diamond
and Dybvig environment. We use a …nite-trader version of their model both
to introduce aggregate risk in a natural and explicit way, and also to provide
a formulation of the sequential-service constraint. We show that a naturallyde…ned mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for each trader to communicate
his type truthfully, and that this dominant strategy equilibrium implements the
symmetric, ex-ante e¢cient allocation as a unique equilibrium outcome. This is
in sharp contrast to Diamond and Dybvig’s deposit-with-suspension mechanism
which works in the absence but not the presence of aggregate risk, since for our
mechanism the distinction between environments with and without aggregate risk
is immaterial. We also consider the analogous allocation mechanism in environments with aggregate risk as well as a sequential-service constraint. We show
that under the assumption that traders’ utility functions exhibit non-increasing
absolute risk aversion, for traders to truthfully communicate their types remains
the unique strategy pro…le that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. Thus, again, the mechanism has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
that possesses an intuitively compelling stability property, and the outcome of
that equilibrium is the symmetric, ex-ante e¢cient, equilibrium.1 Therefore, no
“bank-run” equilibrium exists under the mechanisms we suggest.
We obtain di¤erent results from those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) because
we consider a broader range of banking arrangements than they did. Speci…cally,
they assumed that the banking arrangement must give all depositors who demand early withdrawals the same amount, namely the socially e¢cient amount
based on the true value of the fraction of impatient depositors, no matter how
many depositors actually claim to be impatient. In their model, although the
consumption given to a trader varies with his own claimed type, the amount
for each given type does not depend on the full information communicated to
the bank by all traders. Instead of restricting attention to this type of “simple
contracting”, we allow the bank to utilize more fully the information reported
1

An antecedent result in this spirit is due to De Nicol´ o (1995), who constructs a mechanism
having a unique Bayesian equilibrium and implementing an allocation arbitrarily close to being
e¢cient in Wallace’s (1988) sequential-service version of the Diamond-Dybvig model.
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by all depositors regarding their preferences. The banking arrangement in our
model speci…es consumptions for each trader of a given type under all possible
con…gurations of reported types. In fact, for each vector of messages sent by the
traders, our mechanism assigns traders the e¢cient allocation computed for the
“reported economy”. Allocation rules constructed this way turn out to be capable of preventing traders from lying about their types when they decide whether
or not to make early withdrawals. Also, the mechanism of our model contains
elements of a demand deposit contract: traders have the freedom to choose to
either consume early (by claiming to be impatient) or wait to consume when their
assets mature (by claiming to be patient). In light of our …ndings, Diamond and
Dybvig’s bank-run equilibrium appears to be an artifact of the simple contract
modeling approach rather than a genuine feature of the economic environment
that they have modeled.
Our analysis does not diminish the fundamental importance of Diamond and
Dybvig’s insight regarding …nancial instability, but we think that it shows the
need to synthesize that insight with further ideas in order to understand …nancial
instability fully. In light of the strikingly opposite results obtained in our model
and the occurrence of bank runs in the history of the United States, one wonders
what might prevent the individuals in the Diamond and Dybvig environment from
using e¢cient mechanisms such as the one in our model. What would lead them
instead to adopt the potentially destabilizing demand deposit contract considered
in Diamond and Dybvig? Our results imply that environmental features from
which Diamond and Dybvig’s model abstracts are crucial to a full understanding
of banking instability. In the concluding section, we re‡ect on our analysis to
identify some candidates for such further, complementary ideas.
Following the pioneering work of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), other authors provided important contributions to the literature on ef…cient arrangements of …nancial intermediations. Jacklin (1987) shows that a
credit market arrangement can also implement the e¢cient allocation in the Diamond and Dybvig environment. So the implicit assumption in Diamond and
Dybvig that traders are isolated ex post is crucial for the essential role of demand
deposit contract in implementation. Wallace (1988) emphasizes that a serious
treatment of the sequential service constraint shows the institutional arrangement of deposit insurance as modelled by Diamond and Dybvig in the presence
4

of aggregate risk to be infeasible. Wallace (1988) also provides the insight that the
optimal arrangement in the presence of the sequential service constraint should
have the realized early consumption depend on the order in which the traders
contact the bank.2 Other extensions of the Diamond and Dybvig model include
Alonso (1993), who examines the revelation principle of mechanism design approach in the Diamond and Dybvig models, and Hazlett (1996), who studies
deposit insurance regulation in the Diamond and Dybvig model with risky technologies. Our present paper di¤ers from these work in two ways. We, unlike
these authors, address the issue of designing e¢cient mechanisms that can eliminate the bank-run equilibrium in the original Diamond and Dybvig model. Also,
our paper is the …rst attempt to formalize the sequential service constraint and
incorporate it into the planning problem of the “bank”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the
basic model. In section 3, we construct the implementing mechanism in the case
without the sequential service constraint and illustrate the main results with
an example using a constant relative risk aversion utility function. Section 4
contains the treatment of the sequential service constraint. Section 5 concludes.
The technical proofs of our results are provided in the appendix.

2

Basic Model

The economy consists of two time periods, time 0 and time 1, and I ex ante
identical traders, I < 1. Let I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig be the set of traders. Each of
the traders is uncertain about his preferences over consumptions at date 0 and
date 1. With probability P , a trader becomes a type 0 agent in which case he
derives utility from consumption at date 0 only. With probability 1 ¡ P , the
trader is a type 1 agent in which case he cares about consumptions at both dates.
The set of possible states of nature can thus be represented by - = f0; 1gI :
Each of the traders learns his preferences at the beginning of time 0. Let ! i
denote the realized type of trader i in state ! 2 -. As in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), we assume that a trader’s utility, ui ; is given by a function v: <+ ! < of
a consumption aggregate which includes consumption at both dates, (a0; a1 ), if i
is of type 1, but which consists of consumption at date 0 alone if i is of type 0.
2

Based on this insight, the second part of our paper explicitly proves that there exists
a mechanism that implements the e¢cient allocation as a unique truth-telling equilibrium
outcome.
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That is,
8i

8!

ui (a; !) = v (a0 (i) + ! i a1 (i) ):

(1)

Function v is assumed to have the following property:
Assumption 1. (i) v is strictly increasing, continuously twice di¤erentiable
0
and strictly concave; (ii) v satis…es the Inada conditions limc!0 v (c) = 1 and
0
limc!1 v (c) = 0; and (iii)
00

0

8c cv (c)=v (c) · ¡1 (Relative risk aversion ¸ 1 everywhere).

(2)

Each trader i observes his type only and thus his information set, denoted by
Ei ; is given by
Ei = f;; -; f!j ! i = 0g; f!j ! i = 1gg :

(3)

There is an aggregate endowment of one unit of a good per person, which can be
transformed into a consumption good available at either date 0 or date 1. The
transformation is simply storage until date 0, but whatever is not consumed at
date 0 is augmented by a gross factor of R > 1 at date 1.
An ex-post allocation is a function that speci…es date 0 and date 1 consumptions for each trader. Given the endowment and the transformation technology,
the set of feasible ex-post allocations is
(
)
¯X
¯
[a0(i) + R¡1 a1 (i) ] · I :
(4)
A = a : I ! <2+ ¯
i 2I

A state-contingent allocation is a B-measurable function from - to A. Denote
the set of such B-measurable functions by A- . If ~a 2 A- and ! 2 -, then ~a(!)
is the ex-post allocation that the state-contingent allocation ~a speci…es for state
!. There is a set F µ A- of feasible state-contingent allocations. (That is, F is
a set of B-measurable functions f: - ! A.) The speci…cation of F is supposed
to re‡ect both individual restrictions such as nonnegativity of consumption and
also aggregate restrictions such as materials balance.
Given the state-dependent utility function ui : A £ - ! <, each trader i
maximizes the expectation of this function conditional on his type. Denote this
6

conditional expectation by the function Ui : A- £ - ! <, which is de…ned by
Ui (~a; ! ¤ ) = E [ui (~a(!); !) j Ei ] (! ¤ ):
At the planning stage, the traders form a “bank” by choosing a mechanism
in order to maximize the sum of all traders’ expected utility. Without loss of
generality, we consider direct revelation mechanisms under which each trader
reports to the bank a message mi 2 M ´ f0; 1g:3 As a function of the state of the
environment, then, trader i’s message is an Ei -measurable function ¹i : - ! M .
This function ¹i will be called i’s communication strategy. When each trader
follows his communication strategy in state !, a pro…le ¹(!) = (¹1(!); : : : ; ¹I (!))
is generated which can be used as an informational basis for allocation.
Thus the allocation rule of a mechanism is a measurable function
®: - £ M I ! A

(5)

such that
8m 2 M I ; ®(!; m) is E0 ¡ measurable
and 8¹ 9 f 2 F 8! f (!) = ®(!; ¹(!)):

(6)

An allocation rule ® and a communication-strategy pro…le ¹ together determine
an allocation ® ± ¹ 2 F.4
An equilibrium (speci…cally a Bayesian Nash equilibrium) of the allocation
mechanism (M; ®) is a communication-strategy pro…le ¹¤ such that, for any trader
i and any pro…le ¹ that i can obtain by unilaterally changing his communication
strategy while others’ strategies remain the same, Ui (® ± ¹; !) · Ui (® ± ¹¤ ; !)
almost surely.

3

Implementing the e¢cient allocation in the absence of
the sequential service constraint

In this section, we examine the mechanism design problem in the basic model
assuming that the bank’s resource distribution decision is made after all traders
report their types to the bank. We will show that there exists a mechanism for this
environment which implements the e¢cient allocation as an unique equilibrium.
3

See Alonso (1993) for a study of truthful revelation in the Diamond and Dybvig banking
model.
4
We use the notation ® ± ¹ to denote the state-contintent allocation that takes each state !
to the ex-post allocation ®(!; ¹(!)).
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Consider the problem of choosing ~a 2 F to maximize the sum of traders’
expected utilities. By strict concavity of v, Jensen’s inequality, and the fact that
R > 1 while consumption goods at the two dates are perfect substitutes for
type 1 traders, the following conditions should hold. In each state !, all type
0 traders should receive identical consumption bundles (c0 (!); 0) and all type
1 traders should receive identical consumption bundles (0; c1 (!)). Let µ(!) =
P
i2I ! i denote the number of traders who report to be of type 1 in state !.
Each e¢cient allocation a = ~a(!) should satisfy the following two equations (a
…rst-order condition and a feasibility condition, respectively),
v 0 (c0 (!)) = R v0 (c1 (!))

(7)

[I ¡ µ(!) ]c0 (!) + R¡1 µ(!) c1(!) = I:

(8)

and
These two equations determine ~a(!) uniquely. It is evident that c0 (!) and c1 (!)
depend on ! only through µ(!). The following lemma explains the signi…cance
of the assumption regarding relative risk aversion in Assumption 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose that v satis…es Assumption 1. Then, consumption level c1 (!)
of type 1 traders de…ned by (7) and (8) is a nondecreasing function of µ(!). More
generally, let ´ be a real variable taking values in (0; I) and consider the problem
of maximizing with respect to °
µ
¶
µ
¶
°
R(I ¡ °)
(I ¡ ´) v
+ ´v
:
(9)
I ¡´
´

The solution, parametrized by ´, is a function ¡(´) that satis…es
d R(I ¡ ¡(´))
¸ 0:
d´
´

(10)

Proof. To see that the general monotonicity assertion (10) implies the more
speci…c assertion regarding c1 , note that if 0 < µ(!) = ´ < I, then c0 (!) =
¡(´)=(I ¡ ´) and c1(!) = R(I ¡ ¡(´))=´) by (7) and (8). This equivalence can be
extended to µ(!) 2 f0; Ig, in view of the Inada conditions on v. (That is, de…ning
¡(0) = I and ¡(I) = 0 extends the de…nition of ¡ on (0; I) continuously.)
Corresponding to (7), the …rst-order condition for (9) is
µ
¶
µ
¶
¡(´)
R(I ¡ ¡(´))
0
0
v
¡ Rv
= 0:
(11)
I ¡´
´
8

Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to ´ yields
¸ 00
·
v (¡(´)=(I ¡ ´))
¡(´)
¡0(´) +
+
I ¡´
I ¡´
¸ 00
·
v (R(I ¡ ¡(´))=´)
I ¡ ¡(´)
2
0
R
¡ (´) +
= 0:
´
´

(12)

Now consider the derivative in (10).

d R(I ¡ ¡(´))
¡R
=
d´
´
´

·

I ¡ ¡(´)
¡ (´) +
´
0

¸

:

(13)

· 0; which proves the lemma, is equivNote that the inequality ¡0 (´) + I¡¡(´)
´
alent to
I ¡ ¡(´)
¡(´)
·
:
(14)
´
I ¡´
Inequality (14) follows from the assumption that 8c cv 00 (c)=v0 (c) · ¡1. To
@
see this, note that the assumption implies that @r
[r v 0 (rs)] · 0: This inequality

and equation (11) imply that
µ
¶
µ
¶
I ¡ ¡(´)
¡(´)
0
0
v
¸v
;
´
I ¡´

(15)

which implies (14) by the concavity of v.

3.1

A mechanism with a unique, e¢cient equilibrium

Next we show that the e¢cient allocation determined by conditions (7) and (8)
can be implemented by a truth-telling equilibrium of an allocation mechanism.
In fact, the mechanism (de…ned in Theorem 1 below) possesses a property that
truth-telling is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. That is, whether
a trader is of type 0 or type 1, he receives a higher utility level from revealing
his type truthfully to the bank than from misrepresenting it—regardless of what
reports other traders give. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium is the
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Therefore, no alternative,
ine¢cient, “run” equilibrium of this mechanism can exist.
Theorem 1 Let M = f0; 1g be the set of signals for each trader. De…ne x: M£
f0; : : : ; Ig ! < by the conditions (analogous to (7) and (8)) that
v0 (x(0; ´)) = R v0 (x(1; ´))
9

(16)

and
[I ¡ ´] x(0; ´) + R¡1 ´x(1; ´) = I:
De…ne ® : - £ M I ! A by
Ã
[®(!; m)]i =

(1 ¡ mi )x(mi ;

X

mj );

mi x(mi ;

j 2I

(17)

X
j 2I

mj )

!

:

(18)

The truthful communication strategy ¹
^ i (!) = ! i is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader i. The mechanism thus implements the e¢cient symmetric
allocation in strictly dominant strategies, and consequently the pro…le of truthful
communication strategies is its unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
To prove the theorem, consider separately each of the two possible values of ! i .
If ! i = 0, then by (16) and (18), i will receive a positive amount of consumption
at date 0 if he sends message 0, but will receive 0 consumption at date 0 if he
sends message 1. Because he derives utility only for consumption at date 0, he
strictly prefers to send message 0 rather than message 1 in state !.
Now suppose ! i = 1. The strict concavity of v, together with (16), implies
that
X
X
x(1; 0 +
¹j (!)) > x(0; 0 +
¹j (!))
(19)
j 6=i

j 6=i

regardless of which communication strategies ¹j the other traders use. By (10)
of lemma 1 and the fundamental theorem of calculus,
x(1; 1 +

X
j 6=i

¹j (!)) ¸ x(1; 0 +

X

¹j (!)):

(20)

j 6=i

Therefore, trader i must strictly prefer to send message 1, in which case he
P
receives x(1; 1 + j 6=i ¹j (!)); rather than message 0, in which case he receives
P
x(0; j 6=i ¹j (!)): Thus, truth-telling is the strictly dominant strategy for trader
i. By Myerson (1991), a pro…le of strictly dominant strategies for a mechanism
is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.

3.2

An Example: v(c) = c1¡³ =(1 ¡ ³)

To illustrate the dominant strategy result in Theorem 1, consider the case where
the traders’ utility function is given by v(c) = c1¡³ =(1 ¡ ³) where ³ > 1 is the
relative risk aversion parameter. In this case, it is easily derived that the solution
10

to equations (7) and (8) is
c0 (µ) =
where µ(!) =

I
I ¡ (1 ¡ R

X

1

1
¡1
³

)µ(!)

and c1 (µ) = R ³ c0 (µ) for all ! 2 -;

! i is the number of patient traders in state !:

i2I

Two observations immediately follow. First, since R > 1, c1(µ) is greater
than c0 (µ). The patient traders can take the advantage of the transformation
technology so that they each receive more consumption than do the impatient
traders in every state of nature. Secondly, both c0 (µ) and c1 (µ) strictly increase
with µ; the number of patient traders. The intuition for this is that as the
number of impatient traders decreases, more endowment gets transformed to
date 1 consumption, enabling both types of traders to consume more. These two
properties imply that c1(µ) > c1 (µ ¡ 1) > c0(µ ¡ 1) for all !: This in turn implies
that truth-telling is a strictly dominant strategy for patient traders.

4

Banking in an environment with sequential service constraint

The model of banking studied above abstracts from an important feature of an
actual bank: that traders do not all contact the bank at the same time, and
that the bank must deal promptly with traders who contact it early. The bank
therefore is constrained from making its treatment of those traders contingent
on information yet to be provided by later traders, especially if the early traders
wish to make withdrawals. This feature plays an important role in Diamond
and Dybvig’s (1983) intuitive discussion of their model, and it is formalized by
Wallace (1988) who derives further consequences from it. In view of the striking
discrepancy between Theorem 1 and Diamond and Dybvig’s analysis, and of
the closer analogy between the theorem and Jacklin’s (1987) analysis that also
abstracts from the sequential-service constraint, it is a salient question whether
or not Theorem 1 can be extended to an environment with sequential service.
Now we investigate this question and …nd an answer that is more or less in
the a¢rmative. Speci…cally, if v satis…es non-increasing absolute risk aversion
as well as the conditions speci…ed in Assumption 1, then the pro…le of truthful
communication strategies is the unique pro…le that survives iterated elimination
11

of strictly dominated strategies. It follows that, as in Theorem 1, it is the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the natural mechanism that implements the e¢cient
allocation.
In the present formalization of the sequential-service constraint, every trader
contacts the bank at some time during date 0, these “arrival times” for di¤erent
traders are stochastic and independently distributed, and each trader’s arrival
time is in his own information set. This last detail is crucial, for it implies that
a trader who arrives very late can be almost certain that he is the last trader to
arrive. We will show that, conditional on being last, truthful communication is
the trader’s unique utility-maximizing action. That is, any strategy that involves
some untruthful communication by a trader when he arrives very late can be
eliminated as being dominated by the strategy that agrees with it except at
very late times, but that speci…es truthful communication at those times. This
result can then be “bootstrapped” to apply to communication at earlier times as
well. Through this process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies,
we can show that the e¢cient allocation in the presence of a sequential service
constraint can be implemented as a unique, truth-telling equilibrium.

4.1

Formalization of sequential service

Modelling sequential service requires that the model in the previous section must
be modi…ed by enlarging the state space - to represent information about arrival
times, and by making corresponding changes in the de…nitions of traders’ types
and of feasible allocations.
To enlarge the state space, let - = f0; 1gI £ [0; 1]I ; and P 2 (0; 1): Assume
that for all i · I; Pr(! i = 1) = P; ! I+i is uniformly distributed; and that the
projections of ! on its coordinates are independent r.v.’s. Replace the de…nition
in (3) of trader i’s type by
Ei = ff!j! i = 0 ! I+i 2 Ag [ f!j! i = 1 ! I+i 2 Bg j A 2 F; B 2 F g ;
(21)
where F is the ¾-algebra of Borel sets on [0; 1]. That is, in each state a trader
knows his own utility function and his own arrival time at the bank, but he knows
nothing about the other traders. Also replace the speci…cation in (3) that the
algebra E0 is trivial by the following de…nition, which intuitively speci…es that
information about all traders’ arrival times can be used directly (that is, without
12

having to be revealed by the traders’ communication) as a basis for allocation.
E0 = f!j 8i · I ! I+i 2 Ai j A1 2 F ; : : : ; AI 2 F g

(22)

In order to formulate the sequential service constraint, de…ne the arrivalorder statistics by ¿ : f0; : : : ; Ig £ - ! I. That is, ¿ (1; !); ¿ (2; !); : : : ¿ (I; !) are
the …rst, second, : : : Ith traders in order of arrival determined by the coordinates
! I+1 ; ! I+2 ; : : : ! 2I of !. Ties can be assumed to be broken arbitrarily in the zeroprobability event that several traders arrive simultaneously at the bank. De…ne
the rank statistics ½: I £ f0; : : : ; Ig £ - ! f0; : : : ; Ig, which are inverse to the
order statistics in each state of nature, by ½(¿(i; !); !) = i.
Suppose that ~a = ((X01; X11); : : : ; (X0I ; X1I )) 2 A- is an allocation.5 The intuitive content of the sequential service constraint is that the mechanism represents
a bank operating at a speci…c location that the trader visits at some time during date 0. When trader i visits, he communicates a message m 2 M = f0; 1g
determined by a communication strategy ¹i that is measurable with respect to
Ei , and he then receives X0i (!) immediately. This quantity thus must not depend on information from traders who arrive later in state ! than i does, since
those traders have not yet communicated their information to the bank. Since
all traders are envisioned to arrive at the bank at some time before date 1, when
the consumption amounts X1i (!) are distributed, those date-1 quantities are not
analogously constrained.
That is, the amount X0¿ (1;!)(!) of consumption given to trader ¿(1; !) at date
0 must depend only on the identity of ¿ (1; !) and the time ! I+¿ (1;!) , both of
which the bank observes, and on that trader’s utility parameter ! ¿ (1;!) , which he
has the opportunity to communicate to the bank. (Whether or not he actually
does communicate his utility parameter in equilibrium is irrelevant to the formulation of this constraint, which expresses the limitation imposed by the exogenous
sequential nature of the opportunities for the bank to acquire information.) Next,
the information that the bank can use to determine the date 0 consumption of the
second trader to arrives consists of both this information about the …rst trader,
which the bank remembers, and also the corresponding information about the
second trader himself. And so forth. Formally, ((X01; X11); : : : ; (X0I ; X1I )) satis…es
5

In this section, since - is a continuum, A- denotes the set of Borel-measurable functions
from - to A.
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the sequential service constraint if 8i
h
i
¿ (i;!)
¿ (i;!)
X0
= E X0
j ¿ (1; !); : : : ; ¿ (i; !); ! ¿ (1;!) ; : : : ; ! ¿ (i;!) ; ! I+¿ (1;!) ; : : : ; ! I+¿ (i;!) :
(23)
In view of this constraint, F should be de…ned by
F =

4.2

©

ª

~a j ~a 2 A- and ~a satis…es (23)

:

(24)

The e¢cient, symmetric, state-contingent allocation

The optimization problem the bank faces now is
Maximize

X
i2I

E[ui (~c(!); !)] subject to ~c 2 F;

(25)

with F de…ned by (24).
The key to solving the above problem is the observation, formalized below
in lemma 2, that the arrival-order statistics ¿ (i; !) provide all of the relevant
information about traders’ arrival times. More precise arrival-time information
is relevant neither to traders’ enjoyment of utility nor to the technical feasibility
of allocations in the sequential service environment.6 In view of this observation,
de…ne mappings ¾ i : - ! f0; 1gi for 1 · i · I by
8j · i

¾ ij (!) = ! ¿ (j;

!) :

(26)

De…ne the set of 0–1 sequences of length at most I, including the null sequence,
as S. For s 2 S, let `(s) denote the length of s. De…ne h0i to be the sequence
P
¤
consisting of I consecutive zeros. De…ne µ¤ (s) = i<`(s) si and ¼(s) = P µ (s) (1 ¡
¤
P )`(s)¡µ (s) . De…ne the weak and strict extension-ordering relations on S by
r · s () l(r) · l(s) and 8i · l(r) [ri = si ];
r < s () l(r) < l(s) and 8i · l(r) [ri = si ]:

(27)

For example, if the economy consists of three traders, then space S will contains 14 elements. Among these 14 sequences, (0) and (1) represent, respectively,
the cases that the trader arriving at the bank …rst is type 0 and type 1. The
6

Each trader will use his information about his precise arrival time to make inference about
his probable rank in the arrival queue (which he does not observe directly) though, so this
information is relevant to implementation.
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(strict) extensions of (0), for example, include (0; 0), (0; 1), (0; 0; 0), (0; 0; 1),
(0; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1). In general, the last component of a sequence s represents
the type of the trader who arrives at the bank at the end of that sequence.
Sequential service constraint requires that the bank assign date 0 and date 1
consumptions to each of these sequences in S.
Lemma 2 Suppose that ~a = ((X01 ; X11 ); : : : ; (X0I ; X1I )) solves problem (25). Then
there exists a vector x 2 <S+ such that
"
#
X
X
£
¤
xr = I and 8s 2 S
sl(s) = 1 ) xs = 0 and
xr · I
(28)
r·s

r·h0i

and, almost surely for all i,
9
8
i
i (!)
x
if
j
=
0
and
¾
(!)
=
!
=
0;
>
>
¿
(i;!)
¾
i
=
<
³
´
P
¿ (i;!)
R
i
if j = 1 and ¾ i (!) = ! ¿ (i;!) = 1;
(29)
Xj
= µ(!) I ¡ r·¾ I (!) xr
>
>
;
:
0
otherwise:
If ~a and x are related according to (29), then7
2
Ã
!!3
Ã
X
X
X
X
R
5+
I¡
xq
E[ui (~a(!); !)] =
¼(s) 4
v(xr ) + µ¤ (s)v
¤
µ
(s)
q·s
i2I
l(s)=I
µ¤ (s)>0

¼(h0i)

r2z(s)

X

(30)

v(xr );

r·h0i

where z(s) = fr j r < s and rl(r) = 0g:
Proof:
One can alternatively characterize ~a in terms of a vector of random
¿ (i;!)
variables ((Y01 ; Y11 ); : : : ; (Y0I ; Y1I )), where Yji (!) = Xj
(!) a.s. for each i and
j. Consider the state-contingent allocation ~c = ((Z01 ; Z11 ); : : : ; (Z0I ; Z1I )), de…ned
by Zj¿ (i;!) (!) = E[Yji (!)j¾i ] a.s. It is easily veri…ed that ~c 2 F, and for every i,
E[ui (~a(!); !)] · E[ui (~c(!); !)], with strict inequality for at least one i if ~a 6= ~c.
(This inequality must hold because v is strictly concave and ~c is obtained by
taking conditional expectation with respect to ~a.) That is, ~a 6= ~c would contradict
7

At the optimum, the sum of each trader’s date-0 and date-1 consumptions is always positive
for every state of nature, so expression (30) does not involve terms, such as v(0); that might
be in…nite for some utility functions satisfying the assumptions of this model.
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the hypothesis of the lemma. By construction, ~c—that is to say, ~a—can be
characterized in terms of a vector x 2 <S+ . This vector must actually satisfy (29),
by the same considerations that prove the e¢ciency assertion for the case without
sequential service constraint. (Note that, in the context of (29), condition (28)
states that traders of type 1 consume exclusively at date 1.) Condition (30) is
veri…ed by straightforward computation.
The …rst part of (28) states that the aggregate consumptions of all traders in
state that they are all impatient is equal to the total endowment. The second
part of (28) states that patient agents should not consume at date 0 and that
some a non-negative amount of endowment should be stored for them for date 1
consumption. Condition (29) states that the last trader along a given sequence
¾i (!) receives x¾i (!) if he is impatient and if he is patient, he receives at date
1 an amount equal to the total remaining resources equally divided among all
the patient traders along the sequence implied by !: Expression (30) describes
explicitly the terms in the expectation of the sum of traders utilities.
By Lemma 2, the solution to optimization problem (25) can be found by
optimizing over a set of vectors in <S+ . Speci…cally, given the strict concavity of
the right side of (30), a solution is characterized by a vector that satis…es the
…rst-order conditions for optimization of (30) subject to the constraints (28) and
(29). That is, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 A necessary and su¢cient condition for a state-contingent allocation
~a = ((X01 ; X11 ); : : : ; (X0I ; X1I )) to solve problem (25) is that there should exist a
vector x 2 <S+ that satis…es (28) and (29), and for all r 2 S such that r`(r) = 0,
Ã
Ã
!!
X
X
R
¤
¼(r) v0 (xr ) = R
¼(s) v0
I ¡
xq
+ 0µ (r) ¼(h0 i) v0 (xh0 i )
¤
µ (s)
q ·s
l(s)=I
µ¤ (s)>0
r·s

(31)

:
That is, for any given sequence r 2 S, the consumption for the last trader
who is at the end of r and who is impatient should be chosen so as to balance his
marginal utility of consumption and the sum of the expected marginal utility of
all patient traders who arrive along all possible sequences that are to follow r:
16

4.3

A monotonicity lemma

The …rst order condition just derived in the above lemma for the sequentialservice environment has analogous structure to the …rst order condition (7) in the
simultaneous communication environment studied in section 3. The monotonicity
assertion of Lemma 1, which provides the key to establishing Theorem 1 regarding
the dominant strategy implementability of the e¢cient allocation in that environment, is proved by examining (7). A monotonicity result for a sequential-service
environment is provable on the basis of condition Assumption 1, and it plays an
analogous role to Lemma 1 in establishing implementability.
To understand intuitively the way that this monotonicity lemma will be formulated, it helps to know the order in which strictly dominated strategies will
be eliminated. Essentially, that order is according to backward induction on the
arrival time of a trader at the bank. We will establish that, if a trader arrives at
the bank su¢ciently late at date 0, then he can be sure that everyone who arrives
subsequently will give a truthful report, and that therefore the optimal report for
the trader in question is also truthful. Here “su¢ciently late” means “not before
some time t,” and we will show by working backward in time that t can actually
be taken to be zero. That is, truthful reporting is optimal for a trader regardless
of what time he arrives at the bank.
Consider the case the last trader arrives at the bank. Prior to his arrival,
I ¡ 1 traders had already visited the bank and certain amount resource had been
given to them. Let y(µ) denote the amount of endowment left where µ is the
number of patient traders among the previous I ¡ 1 traders. The bank’s decision
problem in this case is simply as follows. If the last trader is patient, then he at
date 1 will receive Ry=(µ + 1); his share of the remaining endowment transformed
by the R-technology. If instead the last trader is impatient, then the bank needs
to immediately assign him consumption at date 0, denoted by xI ; by balancing
his marginal utility with that of the µ patient traders. Thus, xI satis…es the
following:8
xI = Arg max v(x) + µv
x

0

0

µ

¶
R(y ¡ x)
:
µ

(32)
0

The …rst order condition is v (xI ) = Rv [R(y ¡ xI )=µ] which implies v (xI ) >
8

In the event that µ = 0, the last trader just consumes the endowment available so xI = y:
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0

00

Ry
: This simple observation has
v [R(y ¡ xI )=µ)] : Since v < 0; we have xI < µ+1
important implication regarding the communication strategy for the last trader.
If he is impatient, the last trader surely does not want to claim to be patient
because he does not value date 1 consumption. If he is patient, then he receives
Ry=(µ +1) if he tells the truth which is greater than xI ; the amount he will receive
if he lies. Thus, the trader who arrives the last never lies about his type.
Now consider the situation of a trader i who arrives at the bank at some time
during date 0 after I ¡ J ¡ 1 traders have already arrived, and before the last J
traders will arrive, and who knows that those J traders who follow him will give
truthful reports. Some nonnegative amount of the endowment good will have
already been given to the earlier traders who have reported themselves to be of
type 0, and an amount y remains to be allocated.
Suppose that the I ¡ J ¡ 1 traders who arrive prior to trader i have given a
vector of reports p 2 S, with `(p) = I ¡ J ¡ 1. In terms of a representation like
the one developed in Lemma 2, the bank must allocate consumption in a way
0
speci…ed by a vector ° 2 <S+ , where S 0 = fs 2 Sj l(s) · Jg. If i reports being of
type 0, then the optimization problem of the bank is to maximize
20
1
Ã
Ã
!!3
X
X
X
R
5;
v(° ? )+
¼(s) 4@
v(° r )A + (µ¤ (p) + µ¤ (s))v
y¡
°q
¤
¤
µ
(p)
+
µ
(s)
+
q·s
`(s)=J

r2z (s)

where z + (s) = frj r 2 z(s) and l(r) > 0g: (The second term in the bracket is
taken to be zero if µ¤(p) = µ¤ (s) = 0, since in that case there is no trader who
wishes to consume at date 1.)
If i reports being of type 1, then the maximization problem is to optimize
20
1
Ã
Ã
!!3
X
X
X
R
5:
¼(s) 4@
v(° r )A + (µ¤ (p) + µ¤(s) + 1)v
y¡
°q
¤
¤
µ
(p)
+
µ
(s)
+
1
+
q·s
`(s)=J

r2z (s)

Analogously to what we have done in lemma 1, these formulae can be subsumed
in a general formula. Speci…cally they correspond to ´ = 0 and ´ = 1 in
µ
¶
¡? (´)
(1 ¡ ´)v
+
1¡´
20
1
Ã
Ã
!!3
X
X
X
R
5
¼(s) 4@
v (¡r (´))A + (µ ¤(p) + µ¤ (s) + ´) v
y¡
°q
¤
¤
µ
(p)
+
µ
(s)
+
´
+
q·s
`(s)=J

r2z (s)

(33
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Our goal is to prove the following statement, which formalizes the idea that
a trader of type 1 should reveal his type truthfully if all traders who will arrive
at the bank after him are going to reveal their types truthfully.
0

Lemma 4 For each ´ 2 [0; 1], let ¡(´) 2 <S+ maximize (33) subject to the
constraint (28) (with S 0 replacing S in the statement of the constraint). Suppose
that v satis…es Assumption 1 and also the condition that
8c

d v 00 (c)
¸ 0 (Absolute risk aversion is non-increasing everywhere).
dc v0 (c)

(34)

Then
v ( ¡? (0) ) <

X

`(s)=J

¼(s)v

Ã

R
¤
µ (p) + µ ¤(s) + 1

Ã

y ¡

X

q ·s

¡q (1)

!!

:

(35)

Proof. See the appendix.
If trader i who arrives following a given sequence p of length of I ¡ J ¡ 1
is of type 0, he receives ¡? (0) at date 0. If he is type 1, then he receives zero
date 0 consumption but his date 1 consumption depends the types of traders who
arrive after him. Along a sequence (p; s) that follows p, µ¤ (s) of such J remaining
P
traders will be impatient in which case q ·s ¡q (1) will be given to them at date
0. At date 1, then, the remaining resource will be divided equally among trader i
and all other patient traders. Summing up over all such possible sequences (p; s);
the above lemma says the e¢cient allocation has the property that the expected
utility of trader i is higher if he reports to be patient. Therefore, trader i never
wants to lie about his type.

4.4

A mechanism with a unique, e¢cient equilibrium

In light of Lemma 4, we de…ne a mechanism as follows. Let x : S ! R+ be the
vector satisfying the optimality conditions, (28), (29), and (31). Let M = f0; 1g
be the set of signals for each trader. De…ne ® : - £ M I ! A by
[®(!; m)]i =
Ã

(1 ¡ mi ) x(m¿ (1;!) ; :::; m¿ (½(i;!);!) ); mi P

R

j·I
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mj

Ã

I¡

X
j·I

x(m¿ (1;!) ; :::; m¿ (j;!) )

!!

:

Theorem 2 Suppose that v satis…es Assumption 1 and (34). Then the pro…le
of truthful-communication strategies b
¹i (!) = ! i is the unique pro…le that survives
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies under the above mechanism.
The mechanism thus implements the symmetric, ex ante e¢cient allocation by a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The proof of the theorem follows almost immediately from the “backward
induction” reasoning made in the previous subsection. However, since traders
observe their arrival times only, they do not know their exact positions in a given
sequence of arrivals. So the backward induction reasoning does not guarantee
automatically the result in Theorem 2. But as argued earlier, a trader who
arrives the bank su¢ciently late can be pretty much sure that he is the last trader
to arrive. So he will tell the truth in communicating with the bank. Working
backward from the end of date 0 the beginning, the proof below establishes the
result in Theorem 2.9
Proof. De…ne S i ´ f¹i : f0; 1g £ [0; 1] ¡! f0; 1gg and Sti ´ f¹i 2 S i :
¹i (!) = ! i for ! I+i ¸ tg; where t 2 (0; 1). That is, S i is the space of trader i’s
reporting strategies as functions of !, and Sti is the collection of such strategy
functions that involve truthful reporting if trader i arrives at the bank after time
t.
Consider the reporting decision of trader i if his arrives at the bank later
than time t1 ´ 1 ¡ "1 . Once he arrives at the bank, y units of date 0 good
have been given out to the early traders who approached the bank before trader
i. In deciding on his reporting strategy, trader i compares the expected utility
he will receive from announcing his type truthfully with that from lying. Since
trader i does not observe other traders’ arrival times, the conditional probability
of trader i being the last one to approach the bank is 1¡ ± 1 ´ (1 ¡ "1)I¡1 (given
the uniform distributions of arrival times of all traders).
By telling the truth, i.e., ¹i = 1 = ! i ; trader i receives a utility level equal to
µ
¶
µ µ
¶
¶
R(I ¡ y)
R(I ¡ y)
(1 ¡ ±1 )v
+ ± 1E v
j¿ (i; !) < I ;
µ¤ (¹)
µ¤ (¹)
where ¹ is the vector of the reports of all the traders. If he lies about his type,
9

For the special case where there are three traders each having utility function v(c) =
c =(1 ¡ &); Green and Lin (2000) explicitly solved for the e¢cient allocation: The purpose of
that paper is to illustrate concretely the treatment of sequential service constraint analyzed in
the present general model.
1¡&
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trader i’s utility will be v(¡(0); y): By Lemma 4, v

³

R(I¡y)
µ ¤ (¹)

´

> v(¡? (0); y). So,
if "1 is small enough (i.e., if ± 1 is close enough to 0) then reporting truthfully
yields higher utility: (Since there is a …nite number of trader types, there exists a
±1 > 0 such that the above inequality holds uniformly for all y:) This establishes
that any strategy that involves untruthful communication by a trader when he
arrives at the bank later than time t1 is strictly dominated by a strategy in Sti1 :
Next, suppose that trader i arrives at the bank before time t1 but no earlier
than time t2 ´ t1 ¡ "2 : Let ±2 denote the probability that some trader(s) will
arrive between time ! I+i and t1 : The utility of trader i from truth-telling is then
¶
¶
µ µ
R(I ¡ y)
j ! I+j 2
= (! I+i ; t1 ) for all j
(1 ¡ ±2 )E v
µ¤(¹)
µ µ
¶
¶
R(I ¡ y)
+±2 E v
j ! I+j 2 (! I+i ; t1) for some j
µ¤ (¹)
From the above arguments, traders who arrive later than t1 will report truthfully.
This, along with Lemma 4, implies that the …rst term of the above expression is
greater than the utility trader i receives from reporting lying, namely v(¡? (0);
y); provided that ±2 is small. Thus, any strategy in Sti1 that involves untruthful
report at some time in (t2 , t1 ) is strictly dominated by a strategy in Sti2 .
Repeating the above process backward towards time 0, one can conclude that
the limiting strategy space S0i then consists of only one element, namely ¹i = ! i
Q i
for all !: This unique element in
S0 is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game (M; ®).

5

i2I

Conclusion

In a …nite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model with sequential
service constraint, we have analyzed the question of maturity transformation.
Like Diamond and Dybvig, the (direct revelation) mechanism in our model implements the symmetric, ex ante e¢cient allocation as a truth-telling equilibrium.
Unlike Diamond and Dybvig, however, our mechanism, which does not involve
government intervention (e.g., deposit insurance) of any sort, has no “bank-run”
equilibrium.
Diamond and Dybvig model has been interpreted as an explanation of the
numerous bank runs observed in the U.S. history. We are not claiming, of course,
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that bank runs do not actually occur. Rather, we are simply saying that within
the basic framework of Diamond and Dybvig — even with the sequential service
constraint—there exists an arrangement that implements the e¢cient allocation
without leading to runs. Within the model we considered, we do not see any
reason that rational traders would bypass this optimal arrangement and instead
choose another mechanism that might produce bank runs in equilibrium. Therefore, we think that certain features of reality may not be captured by the Diamond and Dybvig environment in order for it to produce a theory that matches
the history of the United States.
One obvious feature of an actual banking system that the Diamond and Dybvig model, as well as ours, fails to capture is its ongoing nature. If the population
of the economy has an overlapping generation structure, for example, then no
trader is the last one to arrive at the bank as the backward induction methodology in our analysis would require. The same problem would arise if the size of
the population is not observable to individual traders so that no trader is certain whether or not he is almost the last one in line.10 When these features are
present, the validity of our “no-run” result needs to be reconsidered.
Another feature of a real banking industry which is absent in our model is
the incentive problem of banking executives whose objectives may be di¤erent
from that of a social planner. Suppose that the mechanism in our model is run
by a banker, instead of the planner. The traders report their realized types
to the banker who then distributes the resources to the traders, supposedly in
the way speci…ed by the mechanism. But, if the traders cannot observe each
other’s reports, then there is no guarantee that the banker allocates the resources
based on the true reported state of nature. The banker might keep part of
the endowment for his own consumption and then claim that a great deal of
resources has been withdrawn by a number of impatient traders that is larger
than is actually the case. Anticipating this possibility and its consequence that
less resources will be available at time 1, the patient traders may be tempted
to withdraw early, increasing the likelihood of a bank run. Such an incentive
problem might be another explanation of why the banking contract in our model
10

Strictly speaking, the population-size distribution must have in…nite support and a “fat
tail.”
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is not observed, and why runs have historically occurred.11
Finally, we note one direction for future research. Under the treatment of the
sequential service constraint in our model, each trader’s arrival time at the bank
is governed by an exogenous stochastic process. This simple formulation helps
clarify the structure of the optimization problem facing the bank. Alternatively,
one can consider the case that traders’ preferences are realized in a sequential
order, rather than simultaneously as in the present model. After learning about
their types, the traders then decide whether or not to make early withdrawals by
approaching the bank. In such a case, a trader can contact the bank and demand
early withdrawals even before he learns about his type. Also, after observing
his type, a patient trader can either wait until date 1 to consume or go to the
bank to demand early consumption anytime before date 1, if he observes “too
many” traders coming to the bank. Therefore, arrival times are also a part of a
trader’s strategy, along with reporting types to the bank. Relative to the present
model, it is clearly much more di¢cult to analyze implementation of the e¢cient
allocation in such a setting. Extending the present model along this direction
deserves further study.

6

Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4

Proof:
The function ¡ satis…es the following …rst-order condition at each
value of ´ 2 (0; 1).
´
³
³
´´
8 ³
9
P
P
¡? (´)
R
0
0
>
>
¡
R
¼(s)v
y
¡
¡
(´)
FOC
for
¡
v
¤
¤
q
?
>
>
`(s)=J
q<s
1¡´
µ (p)+µ (s)+´
>
>
>
>
<
=
0=
¼(r)v0 (¡³r (´))
>
>
³
´´
>
>
P
P
>
>
>
: ¡R `(s)=J ¼(s)v0 µ ¤ (p)+µR¤ (s)+´ y ¡ q·s ¡q (´)
;
FOC for ¡r ° > ? >
r·s

(36)
This condition implies the following three martingale-marginal-utility equations:
¶
µ
X
¡? (´)
0
=
¼(s) v 0 (¡s (´) ;
(37)
v
1¡´
`(s)=1

for 0 < `(r) < J and r`(r) = 0,

¼(r) v0 ( ¡r (´) ) =

X

¼(s) v0 ( ¡s (´) ) ;

(38)

`(s) = `(r)+1
11

Diamond (1984) and Krasa and Villamil (1992) examined the issue of monitoring in the
context of …nancial intermediation.
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and, for `(r) = J and rJ = 0,
Ã

R
¤
µ (p) + µ ¤(s) + ´

v0 (¡r (´)) = R v0

Ã

y ¡

X

q ·r

¡q (´)

!!

Since R > 1, equation (36) implies that
Ã
Ã
!!
X
X
R
0
0
v (¡? (0)) >
¼(s)v
y¡
¡q (0)
µ¤ (p) + µ¤(s)
q<s

:

(39)

(40)

`(s)=J

By an argument analogous to lemma , involving the martingale conditions (37) (39),
2
Ã
Ã
!!3
X
X
R
d 4
5 · 0:
¼(s)v0
y¡
¡q (´)
(41)
¤
d´
µ (p) + µ¤ (s) + ´
q·s
`(s)=J

By the fundamental theorem of calculus and continuity at the endpoints 0 and
1, (41) implies that
Ã
Ã
!!
X
X
R
¼(s)v 0
y¡
¡q (0)
µ¤ (p) + µ ¤(s)
q·s
`(s)=J
Ã
Ã
!!
X
X
R
0
¸
y¡
¡q (1)
(42)
¼(s)v
µ¤ (p) + µ¤ (s) + 1
q<s
`(s)=J

Equations (40) and (42) imply that
Ã
!!
Ã
X
X
R
v 0 (¡? (0)) >
y¡
¡q (1)
:
¼(s)v0
µ¤(p) + µ¤ (s) + 1
q·s

(43)

`(s)=J

Finally, by assumption (34) (non-increasing absolute risk aversion), there is a
function Á : <+ ! <+ such that Á0 < 0, Á00 > 0, and for all c, v0 (c) = Á(v(c)).
Thus (43) can be rewritten as
Ã Ã
Ã
!!!
X
X
R
Á (v (¡? (0))) >
¼(s) Á v
y ¡
¡q (1)
:
µ¤ (p) + µ¤ (s) + 1
q ·s
`(s)=J

(44)

By convexity of Á and Jensen’s inequality,
0
Ã
Ã
!!1
X
X
R
A :
Á ( v ( ¡? (0)) ) > Á @
¼(s) v
y ¡
¡q (1)
¤
µ (p) + µ¤ (s) + 1
q ·s
`(s)=J

(45)
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Since Á0 < 0; this inequality implies that
Ã
Ã
!!
X
X
R
v (¡? (0)) <
¼(s) v
y ¡
¡q (1)
; (46)
µ¤ (p) + µ¤(s) + 1
q ·s
`(s)=J

which is the desired conclusion.
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